ref: c3e1c158f62458f16e5b538f188bad14844d277d
parent: 8baa8593196a1848773eb8dff26b18cc519f0175
author: cinap_lenrek <[email protected]>
date: Tue Sep 22 14:10:52 EDT 2015
libsec: implement dh parameter signature verification, stop lying about non-rsa ciphers, fix memory leaks in X509 code actually verify the diffie hellman parameter signature, this comes in two flavours. TLS1.2 uses X509 signature with a single hash specified by the signature algorithm field in the signature itself and pre TLS1.2 where md5+sha1 hashes of the signed blob are pkcs1 padded and encrypted with the rsa private key. stop advertizing non-rsa cipher suits (DSS and ECDSA), as we have not implmenented them. fix some memory leaks in X509 code while we'r at it.
--- a/sys/include/libsec.h
+++ b/sys/include/libsec.h
@@ -274,6 +274,8 @@
PEMChain* decodepemchain(char *s, char *type);
uchar* X509gen(RSApriv *priv, char *subj, ulong valid[2], int *certlen);
uchar* X509req(RSApriv *priv, char *subj, int *certlen);
+char* X509verifydigest(uchar *sig, int siglen, uchar *edigest, int edigestlen, RSApub *pk);
+char* X509verifydata(uchar *sig, int siglen, uchar *data, int datalen, RSApub *pk);
char* X509verify(uchar *cert, int ncert, RSApub *pk);
void X509dump(uchar *cert, int ncert);
--- a/sys/src/libsec/port/tlshand.c
+++ b/sys/src/libsec/port/tlshand.c
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@
Bytes *dh_p;
Bytes *dh_g;
Bytes *dh_Ys;
+ Bytes *dh_parameters;
Bytes *dh_signature;
int sigalg;
int curve;
@@ -267,11 +268,9 @@
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0X003A,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0X003C,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 = 0X003D,
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0XC009,
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0XC00A,
+ TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0X0067,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0XC013,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0XC014,
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0XC023,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0xC027,
};
@@ -282,12 +281,10 @@
};
static Algs cipherAlgs[] = {
- {"aes_128_cbc", "sha256", 2*(16+16+SHA2_256dlen), TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
- {"aes_128_cbc", "sha1", 2*(16+16+SHA1dlen), TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
- {"aes_256_cbc", "sha1", 2*(32+16+SHA1dlen), TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
{"aes_128_cbc", "sha256", 2*(16+16+SHA2_256dlen), TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
{"aes_128_cbc", "sha1", 2*(16+16+SHA1dlen), TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
{"aes_256_cbc", "sha1", 2*(32+16+SHA1dlen), TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
+ {"aes_128_cbc", "sha256", 2*(16+16+SHA2_256dlen), TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
{"aes_128_cbc", "sha1", 2*(16+16+SHA1dlen), TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA},
{"aes_256_cbc", "sha1", 2*(32+16+SHA1dlen), TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA},
{"aes_128_cbc", "sha256", 2*(16+16+SHA2_256dlen), TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256},
@@ -318,16 +315,12 @@
CompressionNull /* support of uncompressed point format is mandatory */
};
-// signature algorithms
+// signature algorithms (only RSA at the moment)
static int sigalgs[] = {
0x0601, /* SHA512 RSA */
0x0501, /* SHA384 RSA */
0x0401, /* SHA256 RSA */
0x0201, /* SHA1 RSA */
- 0x0603, /* SHA512 ECDSA */
- 0x0503, /* SHA384 ECDSA */
- 0x0403, /* SHA256 ECDSA */
- 0x0203, /* SHA1 ECDSA */
};
static TlsConnection *tlsServer2(int ctl, int hand, uchar *cert, int certlen, int (*trace)(char*fmt, ...), PEMChain *chain);
@@ -392,7 +385,8 @@
static void freeints(Ints* b);
/* x509.c */
-extern mpint* pkcs1padbuf(uchar *buf, int len, mpint *modulus);
+extern mpint* pkcs1padbuf(uchar *buf, int len, mpint *modulus);
+extern int pkcs1decryptsignature(uchar *sig, int siglen, RSApub *pk, uchar **pbuf);
//================= client/server ========================
@@ -783,16 +777,10 @@
isDHE(int tlsid)
{
switch(tlsid){
- case TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA:
- case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA:
- case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
- case TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA:
- case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA:
- case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
- case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
- case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
- case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
- case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
return 1;
}
return 0;
@@ -805,9 +793,6 @@
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
- case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
- case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
- case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
return 1;
}
return 0;
@@ -988,6 +973,45 @@
return epm;
}
+static char*
+verifyDHparams(TlsConnection *c, Bytes *par, Bytes *sig, int sigalg)
+{
+ uchar hashes[MD5dlen+SHA1dlen], *buf;
+ Bytes *blob;
+ RSApub *pk;
+ char *err;
+
+ pk = X509toRSApub(c->cert->data, c->cert->len, nil, 0);
+ if(pk == nil)
+ return "bad certificate";
+
+ blob = newbytes(2*RandomSize + par->len);
+ memmove(blob->data+0*RandomSize, c->crandom, RandomSize);
+ memmove(blob->data+1*RandomSize, c->srandom, RandomSize);
+ memmove(blob->data+2*RandomSize, par->data, par->len);
+ if(c->version >= TLS12Version) {
+ if((sigalg & 0xFF) == 1)
+ err = X509verifydata(sig->data, sig->len, blob->data, blob->len, pk);
+ else
+ err = "signaure algorithm not RSA";
+ } else {
+ err = nil;
+ if(pkcs1decryptsignature(sig->data, sig->len, pk, &buf) != sizeof(hashes))
+ err = "bad signature";
+ else {
+ md5(blob->data, blob->len, hashes, nil);
+ sha1(blob->data, blob->len, hashes+MD5dlen, nil);
+ if(memcmp(buf, hashes, sizeof(hashes)) != 0)
+ err = "digests did not match";
+ }
+ free(buf);
+ }
+ freebytes(blob);
+ rsapubfree(pk);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
static TlsConnection *
tlsClient2(int ctl, int hand, uchar *csid, int ncsid, uchar *cert, int certlen, uchar *ext, int extlen,
int (*trace)(char*fmt, ...))
@@ -1077,10 +1101,20 @@
if(!msgRecv(c, &m))
goto Err;
if(m.tag == HServerKeyExchange) {
+ char *err;
+
if(!dhx){
tlsError(c, EUnexpectedMessage, "got an server key exchange");
goto Err;
}
+ err = verifyDHparams(c,
+ m.u.serverKeyExchange.dh_parameters,
+ m.u.serverKeyExchange.dh_signature,
+ m.u.serverKeyExchange.sigalg);
+ if(err != nil){
+ tlsError(c, EBadCertificate, "can't verify dh parameters: %s", err);
+ goto Err;
+ }
if(isECDHE(cipher))
epm = tlsSecECDHEc(c->sec, c->srandom, c->version,
m.u.serverKeyExchange.curve,
@@ -1447,7 +1481,7 @@
static int
msgRecv(TlsConnection *c, Msg *m)
{
- uchar *p;
+ uchar *p, *s;
int type, n, nn, i, nsid, nrandom, nciph;
for(;;) {
@@ -1691,6 +1725,7 @@
case HServerKeyExchange:
if(n < 2)
goto Short;
+ s = p;
if(isECDHE(c->cipher)){
nn = *p;
p++, n--;
@@ -1734,6 +1769,7 @@
/* should not happen */
break;
}
+ m->u.serverKeyExchange.dh_parameters = makebytes(s, p - s);
if(n >= 2){
m->u.serverKeyExchange.sigalg = 0;
if(c->version >= TLS12Version){
@@ -1835,6 +1871,7 @@
freebytes(m->u.serverKeyExchange.dh_p);
freebytes(m->u.serverKeyExchange.dh_g);
freebytes(m->u.serverKeyExchange.dh_Ys);
+ freebytes(m->u.serverKeyExchange.dh_parameters);
freebytes(m->u.serverKeyExchange.dh_signature);
break;
case HClientKeyExchange:
@@ -1951,6 +1988,7 @@
bs = bytesPrint(bs, be, "\tdh_Ys: ", m->u.serverKeyExchange.dh_Ys, "\n");
if(m->u.serverKeyExchange.sigalg != 0)
bs = seprint(bs, be, "\tsigalg: %.4x\n", m->u.serverKeyExchange.sigalg);
+ bs = bytesPrint(bs, be, "\tdh_parameters: ", m->u.serverKeyExchange.dh_parameters, "\n");
bs = bytesPrint(bs, be, "\tdh_signature: ", m->u.serverKeyExchange.dh_signature, "\n");
break;
case HClientKeyExchange:
--- a/sys/src/libsec/port/x509.c
+++ b/sys/src/libsec/port/x509.c
@@ -2167,60 +2167,108 @@
return da->len;
}
-static char*
-verify_signature(Bytes* signature, RSApub *pk, uchar *edigest, int edigestlen, Elem **psigalg)
+int
+pkcs1decryptsignature(uchar *sig, int siglen, RSApub *pk, uchar **pbuf)
{
- Elem e;
- Elist *el;
- Bytes *digest;
- uchar *pkcs1buf, *buf;
- int buflen;
+ int nlen, buflen;
mpint *pkcs1;
- int nlen;
- char *err;
+ uchar *buf;
- err = nil;
- pkcs1buf = nil;
+ *pbuf = nil;
/* one less than the byte length of the modulus */
nlen = (mpsignif(pk->n)-1)/8;
/* see 9.2.1 of rfc2437 */
- pkcs1 = betomp(signature->data, signature->len, nil);
+ pkcs1 = betomp(sig, siglen, nil);
mpexp(pkcs1, pk->ek, pk->n, pkcs1);
- buflen = mptobe(pkcs1, nil, 0, &pkcs1buf);
- buf = pkcs1buf;
- if(buflen != nlen || buf[0] != 1) {
- err = "expected 1";
- goto end;
- }
+ buflen = mptobe(pkcs1, nil, 0, pbuf);
+ mpfree(pkcs1);
+
+ buf = *pbuf;
+ if(buflen != nlen || buf[0] != 1)
+ goto bad;
buf++, buflen--;
while(buflen > 0 && buf[0] == 0xff)
buf++, buflen--;
- if(buflen < 1 || buf[0] != 0) {
- err = "expected 0";
- goto end;
- }
+ if(buflen < 1 || buf[0] != 0)
+ goto bad;
buf++, buflen--;
- if(decode(buf, buflen, &e) != ASN_OK || !is_seq(&e, &el) || elistlen(el) != 2 ||
+ memmove(*pbuf, buf, buflen);
+ return buflen;
+bad:
+ free(*pbuf);
+ *pbuf = nil;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static char*
+verify_digestinfo(uchar *sig, int siglen, RSApub *pk, uchar *pdigest, int *psigalg)
+{
+ Elem e;
+ Elist *el;
+ Bytes *digest;
+ uchar *buf;
+ int buflen;
+ char *err;
+
+ el = nil;
+ buflen = pkcs1decryptsignature(sig, siglen, pk, &buf);
+ if(buflen < 0 || decode(buf, buflen, &e) != ASN_OK || !is_seq(&e, &el) || elistlen(el) != 2 ||
!is_octetstring(&el->tl->hd, &digest)) {
err = "signature parse error";
goto end;
}
- *psigalg = &el->hd;
- if(digest->len != edigestlen) {
+ *psigalg = parse_alg(&el->hd);
+ if(*psigalg < 0){
+ err = "unknown signature algorithm";
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if(digest->len != digestalg[*psigalg]->len){
err = "bad digest length";
goto end;
}
- if(memcmp(digest->data, edigest, edigestlen) != 0)
- err = "digests did not match";
-
+ memmove(pdigest, digest->data, digest->len);
+ err = nil;
end:
- mpfree(pkcs1);
- free(pkcs1buf);
+ freevalfields(&e.val);
+ free(buf);
return err;
}
+char*
+X509verifydigest(uchar *sig, int siglen, uchar *edigest, int edigestlen, RSApub *pk)
+{
+ uchar digest[MAXdlen];
+ int sigalg;
+ char *e;
+
+ e = verify_digestinfo(sig, siglen, pk, digest, &sigalg);
+ if(e != nil)
+ return e;
+ if(digestalg[sigalg]->len != edigestlen)
+ return "bad digest length";
+ if(memcmp(digest, edigest, edigestlen) != 0)
+ return "digests did not match";
+ return nil;
+}
+
+char*
+X509verifydata(uchar *sig, int siglen, uchar *data, int datalen, RSApub *pk)
+{
+ uchar digest[MAXdlen], edigest[MAXdlen];
+ int sigalg;
+ char *e;
+
+ e = verify_digestinfo(sig, siglen, pk, digest, &sigalg);
+ if(e != nil)
+ return e;
+ (*digestalg[sigalg]->fun)(data, datalen, edigest, nil);
+ if(memcmp(digest, edigest, digestalg[sigalg]->len) != 0)
+ return "digests did not match";
+ return nil;
+}
+
RSApub*
X509toRSApub(uchar *cert, int ncert, char *name, int nname)
{
@@ -2253,7 +2301,6 @@
CertX509 *c;
int digestlen;
uchar digest[MAXdlen];
- Elem *sigalg;
b = makebytes(cert, ncert);
c = decode_cert(b);
@@ -2267,7 +2314,7 @@
freecert(c);
return "cannot decode certinfo";
}
- e = verify_signature(c->signature, pk, digest, digestlen, &sigalg);
+ e = X509verifydigest(c->signature->data, c->signature->len, digest, digestlen, pk);
freecert(c);
return e;
}
@@ -2674,7 +2721,6 @@
RSApub *pk;
int digestlen;
uchar digest[MAXdlen];
- Elem *sigalg;
print("begin X509dump\n");
b = makebytes(cert, ncert);
@@ -2700,14 +2746,10 @@
print("pubkey e=%B n(%d)=%B\n", pk->ek, mpsignif(pk->n), pk->n);
print("sigalg=%d digest=%.*H\n", c->signature_alg, digestlen, digest);
- e = verify_signature(c->signature, pk, digest, digestlen, &sigalg);
- if(e==nil){
+ e = X509verifydigest(c->signature->data, c->signature->len, digest, digestlen, pk);
+ if(e==nil)
e = "nil (meaning ok)";
- print("sigalg=\n");
- if(sigalg)
- edump(*sigalg);
- }
- print("self-signed verify_signature returns: %s\n", e);
+ print("self-signed X509verifydigest returns: %s\n", e);
rsapubfree(pk);
freecert(c);